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Case T-256/07, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Council, judgment 
of the Court of First Instance of 23 October 2008 (Seventh Chamber), not yet 
reported. 
Case T-284/08, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Council, judgment 
of the Court of First Instance of 4 December 2008 (Seventh Chamber), not yet 
reported.
1. Introduction
The rulings in the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) cases 
annotated here are part of lengthy litigation brought by the PMOI before 
national and European courts in order to challenge national and European 
authorities’ decisions to include the organization in the EU terrorist list and to 
freeze its assets at Community level. All courts which have heard the matter 
have declared the listing of the PMOI unlawful either because of serious pro-
cedural failures,1 or because of lack of evidence as to its current connection 
with terrorist activities.2 In relation to the EU list, the CFI had already declared 
in December 2006 that in including the applicants the Council had failed to 
respect their basic procedural rights.3 Following the first decision, and in order 
to comply with the CFI ruling, the Council sought to remedy these procedural 
failures, while maintaining the group on the list.4 As a result, the PMOI had to 
1. Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI) v. Council, 
[2006] ECR II-4665; this was the first ruling concerning the PMOI and is better known with its 
French acronym of OMPI (Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran). In order to avoid 
confusion we will refer throughout the case note to OMPI/PMOI to indicate the first ruling; and 
to PMOI II and PMOI III to indicate the rulings annotated in this case note. 
2. In Lord Alton of Liverpool and others (in the matter of the People’s Mojahedin Organiza-
tion of Iran) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department), unreported but available on the 
POAC website (www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/poac/Documents/outcomes/PC022006%20PMOI% 
20FINAL%20JUDGMENT.pdf), the decision of the British Home Secretary to refuse to de-
proscribe PMOI was considered “perverse” by the POAC (operative part of the ruling, para 360). 
The POAC refused leave to appeal to the Home Secretary and this was confirmed by the Court 
of Appeal in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Lord Alton of Liverpool, [2008] 
1 WLR 2341; in PMOI III, the CFI found that Council did not submit evidence as to the terror-
ist activities of the group.
3. OMPI/PMOI, supra note 1, case note by Eckes, 44 CML Rev. (2007), 1117; and della 
Cananea, “Return to the due process of law: the European Union and the fight against terrorism”, 
32 EL Rev. (2007), 896. 
4. EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, “Judgment of the Court of First Instance in the OMPI 
Case T-228/02”, para 3; and Notice for the attention of those persons/groups/entities that have 
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bring new proceedings to challenge new decisions5 that confirmed its inclu-
sion in the list, and the cases annotated here concern these more recent chal-
lenges. In both rulings, the CFI annulled the Council decision as far as the 
applicant was concerned, albeit on different grounds. In the first case, the 
applicant had been included at the request of the British Government, while in 
the second case the applicant had been included at the request of the French 
Government. 
The PMOI saga unveils in considerable detail the deep flaws in the EU ter-
rorist listing system. While the CFI’s approach had been very cautious in the 
first two cases, showing a substantial deference to Council’s decisions as to 
who should be defined as a terrorist, in the third, and – it is to be hoped – final,6 
case the Court’s ruling seems to show impatience with the Council’s cavalier 
attitude to judicial protection and the rule of law. For the first time, the CFI 
indicates its willingness to carry out not only a review of compliance with the 
procedural rights of those listed, but also of compliance with the legal condi-
tions required by the Community instruments, and to a certain extent of the 
substantive reasons that led to inclusion. 
These two cases are of paramount constitutional importance in relation to 
both the EU system of proscription and the constraints imposed on the Council 
in defining an individual or an organization as involved in terrorist activity. 
And yet, as we shall see in detail below, the problems are far from solved.
been included by Council Decision 2006/1008/EC of 21 Dec. on the list of persons, groups and 
entities to which Regulation 2580/2001 applies, O.J. 2006, C 320/02. 
5. Council Decision 2007/445/EC of 28 June 2007, implementing Art. 2(3) of Reg. (EC) 
No. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with 
a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decisions 2006/379/EC and 2006/1008/EC, 
O.J. 2007, L 169/58; Council Decision 2007/868/EC of 20 Dec. 2007, implementing Art. 2(3) of 
Reg. (EC) No. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and 
entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision 2007/445/EC, O.J. 2007, 
L 340/100; Council Decision 2008/583/EC of 15 July 2008, implementing Art. 2(3) of Reg. (EC) 
No. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with 
a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision 2007/868/EC, O.J. 2008, L 188/21.
6. The PMOI was finally taken off the list on 26 Jan. 2009, see Council Decision 2009/62/
EC of 26 Jan. 2009, implementing Art. 2(3) of Reg. (EC) No. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and 
repealing Decision 2008/583/EC, O.J. 2009, L 23/25. Following the ruling, the Council brought 
an action in the CFI for the interpretation of the PMOI III ruling. In its action, Council was seek-
ing confirmation that since the act annulled was in substance a Regulation, the ruling would take 
effect only from the date of expiry of the period granted to bring an appeal; the CFI dismissed 
the action as manifestly inadmissible; see Case T-284/08, INTP, Order of 17 Dec. 2008, nyr. 
However, France has appealed the ruling in PMOI III, Case C-27/09 P, France v. People’s 
Mojahedin Organization of Iran; and the PMOI had appealed the ruling in the PMOI II ruling, 
Case C-576/08 P, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Council but it withdraw this, see 
Case C-576/08 P, Order of 3 June 2009, nyr. 
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2. Legal background 
As part of its counter-terrorism strategy, the EU adopted Common Position 
2001/931,7 which is based on a mixed Second and Third Pillar legal basis, and 
which provides for the listing of individuals and organizations to be consid-
ered as connected with terrorism.8 According to Common Position 2001/931, 
the list is drawn up by the Council on the basis of “precise information or 
material” which indicates that “a decision has been taken by a competent 
authority”. The decision must be taken on the basis of “serious and credible 
7. Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 Dec. 2001, on the application of specific 
measures to combat terrorism, O.J. 2001, L 344/93, as updated regularly (hereinafter Common 
Position 2001/931 or the EU list).
8. The EU also adopted Common Position 2002/402/CFSP of 27 May 2002, concerning 
restrictive measures against Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaeda organization and the 
Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them and repeal-
ing Common Positions 96/746/CFSP, 1999/727/CFSP, 2001/154/CFSP and 2001/771/CFSP, 
O.J. 2002, L 169/4 (hereinafter Common Position 2002/402 or the UN-derived list), which gives 
effect to UN Security Council Resolution (1390) 2002, and which was given effect in the Com-
munity through Council Reg. 881/2002 of 27 May 2002, imposing certain specific restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-
Qaeda network and the Taliban …, O.J. 2002, L 139/9. Annexed to the Regulation is a list of 
individuals and organizations (identified at UN level) whose assets are frozen. The list is updated 
by means of a Commission Regulation; it was lastly amended by Commission Reg. (EC) No. 
1330/2008 of 22 Dec. 2008, amending for the 103rd time Council Reg. (EC) No. 881/2002 
imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities asso-
ciated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, O.J. 2008, L 345/60. In 
Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council, judgment of 3 Sept. 2008, nyr, 
the ECJ rejected the CFI’s interpretation of the relationship between Community law and UN 
Security Council Resolutions (Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission, [2005] ECR 
II-3649; Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al arakaaat International Foundation v. Council and Com-
mission, [2005] ECR II-3533), and asserted the primacy, from an internal viewpoint, of the 
former over the latter. As a result, fundamental rights as general principles of Community law 
are applicable to legislation directly implementing Security Council Resolutions. Thus, inclu-
sion in the list at Community level is open to review even when it derives from a UN decision. 
The reception to the ruling has been mixed, e.g. Tridimas, “Terrorism and the ECJ: Empower-
ment and democracy in the EC legal order”, 34 EL Rev. (2009), 103; Halberstam and Stein, “The 
United Nations, the European Union, and the King of Sweden: Economic sanctions and individ-
ual rights in a plural world order”, 46 CML Rev. (2009), 13; Kunoy and Dawes, “Plate tectonics 
in Luxembourg: the Ménage à trois between EC law, international law and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights following the UN Sanctions cases”, 46 CML Rev. (2009), 73; Gattini, 
Annotation of Kadi, 46 CML Rev. (2009), 213; Griller, “International law, human rights and the 
European Community’s autonomous legal order: Notes on the European Court of Justice Deci-
sion in Kadi”, 4 EuConst. (2008), 528; De Búrca, “The European Union and the International 
Legal Order after Kadi”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 1/09, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/
papers/09/090101.pdf; and Weiler, “Editorial: Kadi: Europe’s Meddling”, 19 EJIL (2008), 895. 
Following the Kadi ruling the Commission issued a proposal for a Council Regulation amend-
ing Reg. 881/2002 (COM(2009)187 final), so as to finally provide at least some guarantees to 
those listed (see esp. Art. 7). 
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evidence or clues or condemnation of such deeds” and the “competent author-
ity is a “judicial authority” or, where judicial authorities have no competence 
in the area covered, an “equivalent competent authority in that area”.9 Finally, 
the list must be regularly reviewed and in any event it has to be reviewed at 
least every 6 months.10 The list included in the Common Position naturally 
does not produce direct legal effects; for this reason, the Community enacted 
Regulation 2580/2001 which provides for the freezing of the assets of those 
identified by the Council.11 Such a list must be adopted by unanimity in accor-
dance with the above mentioned procedure contained in the Common Posi-
tion.12 De facto, so far, all those individuals and organizations connected with 
a foreign country listed in the Common Position have also been included in the 
list annexed to the Regulation. Finally, it should be noted that both the Com-
mon Position and the Regulation, contain their own definition of terrorist act 
and of individuals and entities involved in such acts.13 
The legal regime of the EU list is a complex one: on the one hand, there is 
disagreement in the scholarship as to whether the bridging competence con-
tained in the EC Treaty was validly triggered in relation to sanctions against 
individuals.14 On the other hand, the fact that the list must be updated every 6 
months makes any legal challenge ineffective since, as we shall see in more 
detail below, the Council is always a step ahead of those bringing judicial 
review proceedings. It is only in the PMOI III case that finally, and thanks to 
the urgent procedure, the CFI had the chance of declaring the invalidity of a 
list still in force at the time of the ruling.15
9. Common Position 2001/931, Art. 1(4).
10. Common Position 2001/931, Art. 1(6). 
11. Council Reg. 2580/2001 of 27 Dec. 2001, on specific restrictive measures directed 
against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, O.J. 2001, L 344/70; the 
Regulation was adopted by relying on the bridging competence contained in Arts. 301 and 60 
EC, as supplemented by the residual competence contained in Art. 308 EC, and for this reason it 
is confined to alleged terrorists having a link with a third country. The Commission and the 
Council in fact believed that in relation to alleged terrorists not having links outside the EU, the 
bridging competence between CFSP and the EC could not be used.
12. Reg. 2589/2001, Art. 2(3).
13. Common Position 2001/931, Art. 1(3) and 1(2) respectively; Art. 1(4) of Reg. 2580/2001 
provides that the definition of “terrorist act” shall be that contained in Art. 1(3) of Common Posi-
tion 2001/931, whilst Art. 2(3) defines those that can be included in the list and is very similar to 
if not substantially the same as the definition in Common Position 2001/931. 
14. E.g. Tridimas, op. cit. supra note 8, 103; the ECJ has made clear in Kadi that the EC does 
have such competence.
15. So far, all the actions brought before the CFI, excepting those which were inadmissible, 
have been successful on the grounds of breach of essential procedural requirements. E.g. Case 
T-47/03, Sison v. Council, [2007] ECR II-73; Case T-327/03, Stichting Al-Aqsa v. Council, 
[2007] ECR II-79; Case T-229/02, Osman Ocalan, on behalf of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK) v. Council, [2008] ECR II–45. The first action brought by these applicants failed because 
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3. Factual background and previous legal challenges 
The PMOI was founded in 1965 with the aim of replacing the Iranian Shah’s 
regime with a democracy; after the Iranian revolution, the organization also 
fought against the regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini, and engaged in armed 
actions. It then renounced violence and gave up arms from 2001.16 
It was first placed on the UK terrorist list in 2001 (having already been 
placed on the US list in 1997) and then on the EU terrorist list in 2002. In 2002, 
the PMOI brought proceedings before the CFI to challenge its inclusion in the 
EU list, and as we shall see in more detail below, the Court annulled its inclu-
sion in that list on the grounds that the applicants’ fundamental procedural 
rights had been violated. In order to comply with the ruling the Council then 
issued a notice indicating that it would provide those listed with a statement of 
reasons;17 the applicants were however kept on the list.18 
the CFI found that Mr Ocalan did not have standing to represent the PKK (Case T-229/02, [2005] 
ECR II-539); however the ECJ reversed this (C-229/05 P, [2007] ECR I-439); Case T-253/04, 
KONGRA-GEL v. Council, [2008] ECR II–46. 
16. As one would expect, the assessment of the merits and faults of the organization varies 
considerably; members of several national parliaments have called for the de-listing of the organ-
ization (e.g. German MPs as reported by the euobserver on 25 Nov. 2008, euobserver.
com/?aid=27172). Several MPs in the UK have not only called for de-listing but brought suc-
cessful legal proceedings in the UK to have the organization struck off the UK domestic list (dis-
cussed in the main text below). On the other hand, in 2005, Human Rights Watch published a 
damning report about practices in the PMOI camps, No Exit: Human Rights Abuses inside the 
Mojahedin Khalq Camps www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/mena/iran0505/index.htm; this 
gave rise to strong reactions by the PMOI who published a press release entitled “Human Rights 
Watch Report: A Catalogue of Lies Intended to Help Ruling Theocracy” (14 June 2005), availa-
ble on www.ncr-iran.org/content/view/60/1/; and by the Friends of a Free Iran, a group of 
 European Parliamentarians, that issued their own counter-report “People’s Mojahedin of Iran: 
Mission Report”, available on ncr-iran.org/images/stories/advertising/ep%20report-with%20
cover.pdf; Human Rights Watch’s response to the criticism can be found on www.hrw.org/en/
news/2006/02/14/statement-responses-human-rights-watch-report-abuses-mojahedin-e-khalq-
organization-#_ftnref2. All of the above websites were lastly accessed on 22 Jan. 2009. 
17. Notice for the attention of those persons/groups/entities that have been included by 
Council Decision 2006/1008/EC of 21 Dec. on the list of persons, groups and entities to which 
Reg. 2580/2001 applies, cited supra note 4.
18. And in breach of the requirements of Common Position 2001/931 and of Reg. 2589/2001, 
it failed to review the list within the 6 months prescribed. Rather, more than a year elapsed 
before the reviews. The Council did adopt a decision in Dec. 2007 but this was merely to add 
people to the list rather than re-examine those already included, see Council Decision of 21 Dec. 
2006, implementing Art. 2(3) of Reg. (EC) No. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures 
directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, O.J. 2006, 
L 379/123. Each review entails the adoption of a new decision (see PMOI II, para 69). I have 
argued elsewhere that the 6 months review should be considered mandatory, and not left to the 
Council’s goodwill, see Spaventa “Fundamental rights and the interface between the Second and 
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In the meantime, a group of British Members of Parliament brought an 
action before the Proscribed Organization Appeal Commission (POAC), a spe-
cial tribunal set up to review inclusion in the UK list, asking the Appeal Com-
mission to strike off the applicant from the UK list. The POAC, after having 
considered the evidence, some of which was classified and could therefore not 
be seen by the applicants, declared the decision to maintain the applicants on 
the list “perverse”.19 The Court of Appeal subsequently refused leave to appeal 
to the Home Secretary on the grounds that the action had no reasonable pros-
pect of success.20 PMOI also brought a second challenge, against a new EU 
decision which kept them on the list. This second challenge was adjudicated 
after the decisions of the POAC and Court of Appeal. Again, PMOI won the 
case; however, in the meantime a new decision had been adopted and therefore 
PMOI had to bring a third case, which also benefited from the accelerated 
procedure, and again the CFI declared the inclusion in the list unlawful.
We shall first recall briefly the decision in the first OMPI/PMOI case, to 
then turn to a detailed analysis of the second and third decisions.
3.1. The ruling in OMPI/PMOI I
The most important points made by the CFI in the OMPI/PMOI I case are the 
following:
The right to a fair hearing applies to the Council’s decisions to include or 
maintain someone in the list.21 This comprises two parts: notification of the 
evidence and the right for the person/organization concerned to make his/its 
view known on the evidence.
A decision of a national authority is an essential precondition for placing an 
organization/individual on the EU list and therefore the right to a fair hearing 
must be guaranteed first and foremost at national level.22
Third Pillar” in Maresceau and Dashwood (Eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations 
(CUP, 2008), p. 129, at p. 143. 
19. Appeal No.: PC/02/2006, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Others (In the matter of the 
 People’s Mojahadeen Organisation of Iran) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
judgment of 30 Nov. 2007, available on the POAC’s website, www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/poac/
Documents/outcomes/PC022006%20PMOI%20FINAL%20JUDGMENT.pdf.
20. Court of Appeal, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, judgment of 7 May 2008, [2008] EWCA Civ 443; [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. 31.
21. The CFI decided not to adjudicate on whether the right to effective judicial protection 
applied to the listing or whether, as argued by the Council, the Court had no jurisdiction to 
review the internal lawfulness of the provisions of Reg. 2580/2001 since they were adopted by 
virtue of powers circumscribed by the general anti-terrorism security Council Resolution 
(1373(2001)); paras. 110 et seq. Following the ruling in Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council, cited 
supra note 8, this question is no longer relevant. 
22. Exp. para 119 of OMPI/PMOI I, cited supra note 1. 
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The right to a fair hearing is limited to the “legal conditions” of application 
of the Community measure (i.e. that there is an initial decision to freeze funds; 
that there is specific information in the file showing that a decision has been 
taken by a national authority; and, in the case of subsequent decisions that 
there is a justification for maintaining someone in the list).23 
For obvious reasons of effectiveness, in the case of first inclusion in the list, 
notification might be postponed to after the decision has been taken. For less 
obvious reasons, in the case of an initial decision there is no right to a hearing, 
not even after the decision has been taken, since the parties can bring judicial 
proceedings.24 On the other hand, in the case of subsequent decisions, the deci-
sion to maintain someone in the list must be preceded by the possibility of a 
hearing and, if appropriate, notification of new evidence. 
However, and this is the biggest limitation of the CFI ruling, these are mere 
procedural rights in that there is no requirement in Community law for the 
party concerned to be afforded the possibility of questioning whether the deci-
sion is well founded, since those issues, in the Court’s view, can only be raised 
at national level. And there is, as a general rule, no possibility to make one’s 
views known in relation to whether the decision is based on “serious and cred-
ible evidence or clues”.25 
Overriding considerations of security or of conduct of national/Community 
international relations may preclude disclosure of evidence, and consequently 
the right to a hearing. This might apply to any information, including that 
 relating to the identification of the Member State or third country in which a 
competent authority has taken a decision. However, in order to guarantee 
effective review, the Council cannot raise objections to disclosure of evidence 
on the grounds that such information is secret or confidential.
23. Worryingly, in an obiter the Court held that it is not even for the Council to investigate 
whether proceedings at national level were conducted correctly or whether the fundamental 
rights of the applicants were respected (para 121).
24. The Council seems to have taken a more liberal view and in the Factsheet “The EU list 
of persons, groups and entities subject to specific measures to combat terrorism” (27 Jan. 2009) 
indicates that a person/entity listed has a right to send documents to the Council to ask it to 
reconsider its decision even after the first listing (page 4). 
25. In the eyes of the CFI (para 125) when the Council based its initial decision or a subse-
quent decision “on information or evidence communicated to it by representatives of the Mem-
ber State without it having been assessed by the competent national authority” (emphasis added) 
then this would be considered as newly adduced evidence and therefore it would be subject to 
notification and hearing at Community level. However, it is difficult to reconcile this statement 
with the wording of Art. 1(4) Common Position 2001/931 which states the list shall be “drawn 
up on the basis of precise information or material in the relevant file which indicates that a deci-
sion has been taken by a competent authority” (emphasis added). It seems therefore that the 
decision of a competent authority is a necessary pre-condition for inclusion in the list, and that 
therefore in the absence of such decision inclusion in the list would fail to meet the requirements 
for legality prescribed in Common Position 2001/931. 
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Finally, the standard of review is restricted to checking that “rules govern-
ing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the 
fact are materially accurate, and there has been no manifest error of assessment 
of the facts or misuse of power”.26 
Since none of the procedural safeguards described above had been complied 
with, the relevant Council decision was annulled insofar as it concerned the 
applicant; however, the Council did not strike off the applicant from the list but 
rather it provided it with a statement of reasons as to its inclusion.27 
The ruling in OMPI/PMOI I is constitutionally very important, in that, at 
least in theory, it rejects the possibility a grey legal area in relation to counter-
terrorism measures. However, the ruling is also rather limited in its impact 
since it confines the applicants’ rights to mere procedural rights, and limits, if 
not altogether excludes, the possibility for a meaningful substantive review of 
the decision to include someone in the list and freeze their assets. As we shall 
see, these limitations are present also in the PMOI II ruling, and to a lesser 
extent in the PMOI III ruling.
4. The PMOI II ruling 
As mentioned above, following the first OMPI/PMOI ruling, the Council pro-
vided the applicants with a statement of reasons, which clarified that a decision 
by a competent authority (in the UK) had been taken regarding the applicant; 
that that decision was still in force; that it was subject to review under British 
law; and that therefore the reasons for including the applicant in the EU list 
still applied. The applicants therefore brought new proceedings for annulment 
in front of the CFI. The case was decided under the expedited procedure. 
It should be recalled that whilst the case was pending the Proscribed Orga-
nization Appeal Commission (POAC) declared the Secretary of State’s deci-
sion to proscribe PMOI as perverse and ordered that the PMOI be struck off 
the UK list; and the UK Court of Appeal refused the Government’s request for 
leave to appeal, therefore putting an end to the British procedure. After the 
POAC decision but before the final Court of Appeal ruling, the Council adopted 
a new decision and, again, it maintained the applicants in the list; the appli-
cants were authorized by the Court to amend their pleadings so as to appeal 
also against this decision. Therefore, the ruling discussed concerns both Deci-
sion 2007/445 (the June 2007 Decision) as well as Decision 2007/868 (the 
Dec. 2007 Decision).28 
26. Para 159.
27. See General Secretariat Document 5418/1/07 REV, 17 Jan. 2007. 
28. Council Decision 2007/445/EC, cited supra note 5; Council Decision 2007/868/EC, 
cited supra note 5. 
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4.1. The June 2007 Decision
The first issue for discussion was the relationship between the June Decision 
and the original decision to include the PMOI in the terrorist list annulled in 
the first OMPI/PMOI ruling. The applicants argued that the June Decision was 
vitiated since it was based on the assumption that the Council was allowed to 
“maintain” the applicants on the list. However, since the previous decision had 
been annulled, then the applicants could not be “maintained” on that list. The 
CFI rejected this objection: it held that when a measure is annulled for formal 
or procedural defects, as it was the case in OMPI/PMOI I, then the institution 
can adopt an identical measure provided the latter is not vitiated by the same 
defects. In any event, the Court pointed out that the re-examination required by 
Article 1(4) of the Common Position entailed the adoption of a new decision 
each time. Similarly, the CFI rejected the applicants’ argument that the June 
Decision could not be based on the same material (i.e. the British Home 
 Secretary’s decision) as the original decision; since the original decision was 
vitiated by procedural defects it was open to the Council to adopt a new deci-
sion based on the same information as the original decision, provided the 
defects were remedied. 
The second part of the ruling concerns more substantive issues as to whether 
inclusion in the list was justified. The applicants argued that the Council had 
not taken into account the exculpatory material that it had provided; and that 
they had not been given an opportunity to express their views at a hearing. The 
CFI dismissed this objection on the ground that neither Regulation 2580/2001 
nor the general right of defence gives the persons concerned the right to such 
a hearing.29 Further, the fact that the Council had passed on the material pro-
vided by PMOI to the Member States’ delegations before the adoption of the 
June Decision was sufficient, and in any event Council had no duty to reply to 
the applicants’ observations if it thought that the documents submitted “did not 
warrant the conclusions that the applicant claimed to infer from them”.30 Fur-
ther, the Court found that whilst the Council is under a duty to take into account 
the factual circumstances justifying the measures, and the legal considerations 
leading to their adoption, it is not under a duty to discuss all the points of fact 
and law which may have been raised by the persons concerned during the 
administrative procedure.31 
The applicants also questioned the Council’s interpretation of Article 2(3) 
of Regulation 2580/2001, arguing that since the definition of terrorist act 
29. PMOI II, para 93. 
30. Ibid., para 95.
31. Ibid., para 101.
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 contained in the Common Position is expressed in the present tense, only cur-
rent and present terrorist activity justifies inclusion in the list. The CFI dis-
missed also this objection, stating that nothing in the Common Position or in 
the Regulation precludes “the imposition of restrictive measures on persons 
and entities that have in the past committed acts of terrorism, despite the lack 
of evidence to show that they are at present committing or participating in such 
acts”.32 Moreover, the Court failed to circumscribe in any way the power of the 
Council to list organizations based on past conduct alone: on the contrary, it 
stated that those measures are based more on an appraisal of future threat than 
on evaluation of past conduct and that the Council’s broad discretion in these 
matters extends to the evaluation of the threat represented by an organization, 
regardless of the fact that it has suspended its terrorist activities for a longer or 
less extended period, or even when such activities have apparently stopped 
altogether.33 
By far the most important part of the ruling, however, concerns the burden 
of proof and the standard of review required by Community law in relation to 
measures freezing the assets of alleged terrorist organizations. Here, the PMOI 
argued that given the effect of the measures under consideration, and their 
impact on the applicants’ rights of freedom of expression, freedom of associa-
tion and right to property, the burden to prove that the measures adopted are 
necessary fell on the Council. Further, the PMOI also argued that such burden 
of proof should be that required in criminal cases, and that the Court should 
conduct a full review of the facts, both those relied upon by the Council and 
those relied upon by the applicants. On the other hand, the UK argued that the 
proceedings in which such measures are challenged are civil proceedings and 
therefore the standard of proof would be that applicable to civil proceedings 
and the burden of proof would fall on the applicant. As for the standard of 
review applicable, both Council and the UK also argued that the Court should 
not substitute its own assessment of the facts and evidence for that of the 
Council.
The Court substantially upheld the Council’s position. It started by restating 
its findings in the OMPI/PMOI I case: thus, in adopting the first decision con-
cerning the freezing of assets of a group or a person, the Council must simply 
verify that a decision by a competent national authority has been adopted, 
whilst in relation to subsequent decisions to maintain someone on the list 
Council has to verify the consequences of that decision at the national level. 
This means, in the Court’s view, that the role of the burden of proof is rather 
limited since it just relates to proving the existence of precise information in 
32. Ibid., para 107.
33. Ibid., para 112. 
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the relevant file indicating that a decision at national level has been taken; and, 
in the case of subsequent decisions, to whether the freezing of funds is still 
justified, having particular regard to the action taken upon the decision of the 
competent national authority. Finally, the Court re-stated that the Council 
enjoys discretion in assessing the reasons why a person should be subject to 
the fund-freezing measure. Thus, the review performed by the Court is limited 
to scrutinizing whether there has been a “manifest error of assessment”.34 In 
the case at issue, and in relation to the June Decision, the Court found that 
there had been no such error since there was a decision of a national authority. 
Furthermore, the Court added that when there is an appeal pending against the 
national decision, the Council acts “reasonably and prudently” when it refuses 
to “express an opinion on the validity of the arguments on substance raised by 
the party concerned” before the outcome of the national proceeding is known. 
Otherwise, there would be a risk that the Council’s findings might differ from 
those of the national tribunal or court.35 As a result, the CFI upheld the validity 
of the June Decision.
4.2. The December 2007 Decision
On the other hand, the December Decision was annulled: the main difference 
between the two decisions lay in the fact that, as mentioned above, when the 
June Decision was adopted the appeal against the UK Home Secretary’s deci-
sion to include the PMOI in the national list was still pending, whilst when the 
December Decision was adopted the POAC had already ruled that the Home 
Secretary’s decision was perverse (although the applicants were still on the 
UK list since an appeal from the Government was pending). Thus, the circum-
stances between the June and December Decision had changed. However, the 
Council’s statement of reasons did not reflect, or did not sufficiently reflect, 
this change of circumstances and therefore the new decision was annulled.
5. The PMOI III ruling
It has been mentioned that the terrorist list needs (at least in theory) to be 
reviewed every six months. Not surprisingly then, whilst the PMOI II proceed-
ings were still in course, the Council adopted a new decision (the July 2008 
Decision),36 which included the applicants. At the time the July 2008 Decision 
34. Ibid., para 141, emphasis added.
35. Ibid., para 147.
36. Council Decision 2008/583/EC, cited supra note 5. 
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was adopted, the British Home Secretary, in order to comply with the decision 
of the POAC, had already removed the PMOI from the list of organizations 
proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. This notwithstanding, the Council 
held that new information which had been brought to its attention justified 
maintaining the PMOI on the EU list. Consequently, the PMOI brought fresh 
proceedings for annulment. The case was decided under the expedited proce-
dure at considerable speed.37 
In the preliminary procedure, the Court ordered the Council to provide all 
documents relating to the adoption of the decision under scrutiny, clarifying 
that should the document be deemed confidential, they would not, at that stage 
in the proceedings, be communicated to the applicants. The Council made such 
a request for one of the documents which it had submitted. Further, the Court 
also ordered the disclosure of all documents relating to the voting procedure 
leading to the adoption of the decision.
The first issue to be addressed by the Court, with which this annotation is 
not directly concerned but which raises very important issues about account-
ability, related to the voting procedure followed for the purposes of the con-
tested decision. As mentioned above, the July 2008 Decision was adopted after 
the British Government had de-listed the PMOI in order to comply with the 
POAC ruling. Following the July Decision, during a debate in the House of 
Lords, Lord Waddington asked Lord Malloch-Brown, Minister of State for the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, how the UK had voted in relation to the 
PMOI’s continued inclusion in the EU terrorist list. This, of course, was very 
relevant since the decision to include or maintain someone in the list must be 
taken by unanimity. Lord Malloch-Brown held that the UK Government had 
abstained and following further questioning as to why it abstained when it 
should have opposed inclusion to comply with the POAC ruling, Lord Mal-
loch-Brown held that the Government had no choice since the list was a “total 
list” and that therefore it was on a take it or leave it basis.38
Relying on this evidence, the PMOI argued before the CFI that the voting 
process leading to the adoption of the July Decision was vitiated by irregular-
ity since the Council should consider each individual or organization on its 
own merits. The CFI therefore decided to look into the matter and, as men-
tioned above, requested the disclosure of the documents relating to the voting 
process. Those documents showed that the Council had reviewed the names on 
the list on a case-by-case basis, and that indeed it had written to all Members 
of the Council specifically in relation to the PMOI. The applicants’ contention 
37. Less than 5 months elapsed between the date when the case was lodged (21 July 2008) 
and when it was decided (4 Dec. 2008). 
38. House of Lords, Hansard 22 July 2008, Column 1650, available at www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldhansrd/text/80722-0002.htm. 
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was therefore dismissed. This of course leaves open the unpalatable question 
as to who exactly, the Council or the British Government, was being economi-
cal with the truth.39 And, it raises some suspicion that, in certain instances, 
inclusion in the list might be motivated solely by political expediency. 
The second issue for consideration, which in itself was sufficient to deter-
mine the illegality of the decision, related to the breach of the right of defence. 
The Council had in fact failed to inform the applicants of the new information 
in the file which in its opinion justified it to be maintained in the list. This was 
in breach of the OMPI/PMOI 1 ruling, where the Court made clear that when 
a person or an organization is maintained on the list, it has to be notified of the 
reasons prior to the adoption of the relevant decision. Since Council could not 
substantiate its claim that it was impossible for it to notify the applicant in 
advance, the right of the defence had been breached and the decision was viti-
ated. Interestingly the Court left unanswered the question whether the Council 
has an immediate duty to remove a person/organization from the list once a 
national court has found that the national decision which led to listing at Com-
munity level is not warranted.40 
But the most important part of the ruling is undoubtedly the third part, where 
the CFI discussed whether the legal requirements provided in Article 1(4) to 
(6) of Common Position 2001/931, and Article 2(3) of Regulation 2580/2001, 
had been satisfied. It might be recalled that Article 1(4) to (6) of the Common 
Position prescribes that inclusion in the list must be based on a decision by a 
national authority, based on serious and credible evidence or clues. Further, the 
authority must be a judicial authority or, where judicial authorities have no 
competence, an equivalent authority. As mentioned above, when the July 2008 
Decision was adopted, the British Home Secretary’s decision in relation to the 
applicants was no longer in force. Rather, the PMOI had this time been included 
at the request of the French Government, which based its request on the fact 
that a judicial enquiry had been opened against the applicants in 2001; and that 
charges were brought in 2007 against some individuals alleged to be members 
of the PMOI. The French Government circulated in Council three documents; 
however, two were classified as confidential. Following an order by the Court 
39. Lord Malloch-Brown in a House of Lords debate held on 12 Jan. 2009 said “This gives 
me the opportunity to say that, while the Court thought the view incorrect that it was impossible 
to vote against only one member of that list, I checked back with officials, who have reconfirmed 
that it is up to the presidency of the European Council at the time to determine how such busi-
ness is dealt with. A whole list was given and there was no option but to vote it up or down. 
Therefore, if we had not abstained, other terrorist organizations would have been delisted”. 
 Hansard Column 1005, available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldhansrd/
text/90112-0001.htm#0901126000024. It should be noted that France held the presidency of the 
Council, and that it was at France’s request that the PMOI was kept on the list. 
40. PMOI III, para 40. 
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as to disclosure, the French Government held that due to domestic legal 
requirements it could not comply with the Court’s order in the time set by the 
Registrar. In any event, the Council pointed out that it had not been provided 
by the French Government with any additional evidence than that it had set out 
in the statement of reasons. As a result, the Court found that the Council failed 
to prove that the conditions provided in the Common Position and the Regula-
tion as to the existence of a national decision had been satisfied. 
In particular, the Court clarified that the fact that the Council possesses 
broad discretion in the assessment of the considerations that lead to listing, 
does not “mean that the Court is not to review the interpretation made by the 
Council of the relevant facts”.41 Thus, the Community judicature must “not 
only establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and 
consistent, but must also ascertain whether that evidence contains all the rele-
vant information to be taken into account in order to assess the situation and 
whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.”42 How-
ever, the Court also clarified that it would not substitute its judgement for that 
of the Council. Further, and after having affirmed how the evidence in the file 
was insufficient and how it was doubtful that a “decision of a national author-
ity” for the purposes of the Common Position and the Regulation had been 
taken, the Court dealt with the Council’s claim relating to confidentiality. Here, 
consistently with the OMPI/PMOI I ruling, the Court refuted the Council’s 
viewpoint in no uncertain terms: it noted that it had not been explained why the 
production of information in Court would violate confidentiality while pro-
duction of the same information to the governments of 26 Members States 
would not. More importantly the Court held that “the Council is not entitled to 
base its funds-freezing decision on information or material in the file commu-
nicated by a Member State, if the said Member State is not willing to authorize 
its communication to the Community judicature whose task is to review the 
lawfulness of that decision”.43 Finally, the Court clarified that it had jurisdic-
tion to review both lawfulness and merits of funds-freezing measures. As a 
result, the Court found that the Council had not complied with the require-
ments of Common Position 2001/931 and Regulation 2580/2001, and that 
therefore the July 2008 Decision was null. The applicants were finally taken 
off the list in January 2009.44 
41. Ibid., para 55. 
42. Ibid., para 55, emphasis added. 
43. Ibid., para 73. 
44. See also Factsheet, cited supra note 24, which arguably goes beyond the requirements of 
the PMOI rulings. 
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6. Analysis 
The rulings summarized above are of paramount importance in defining the 
limits within which the Council can act in relation to fund-freezing measures. 
In this respect, the PMOI III ruling demonstrates the Court’s willingness to 
engage in a more substantive review of the legal conditions that must be satis-
fied before an individual or an organization can be placed on the Community 
list. And yet, it should not be forgotten that the factual circumstances in that 
case were rather extreme: a national court had had the chance to look at the 
evidence and found that there was such a lack of it that the decision to pro-
scribe the organization could be defined as “perverse”; no decision had been 
adopted in France; and the French Government refused to disclose documents. 
The fact that the Court lost its patience is then not surprising. This said, it is not 
entirely clear how the two rulings annotated relate to each other. In the writer’s 
opinion PMOI III has not really affected the previous rulings concerning the 
listing of terrorists. Thus, one should query whether the listing regime, even 
given the limits set by the Court to the executive power, is as such compatible 
with acceptable standards of judicial and fundamental rights protection. We 
shall highlight the most important issues arising from the current legal regime, 
together with the limits in effective legal protection arising from the Court’s 
rulings.
6.1. The division of competences between national and Community   
 authorities
The legal regime established by Common Position 2001/931 and Regulation 
2580/2001 mixes elements of national decision making with EU decision mak-
ing. Thus, and as already mentioned, Article 1(4) Common Position 2001/931 
provides that inclusion in the EU list must be preceded by a decision at national 
level by a judicial or equivalent authority. Leaving aside the problems arising 
from the lack of definition of what is to be considered an authority equivalent 
to a judicial one,45 Article 1(4) clearly creates a bridge between national and 
EU decision making where the latter is conditional upon the former. Articles 6 
and 8 of Regulation 2580/2001 widen this bridge in providing that Member 
States might grant a specific authorization to unfreeze funds (Art. 6), after hav-
ing notified the other Member States, the Council and the Commission, but 
45. The CFI does not engage with this question, although it considers the Home Secretary – 
a purely executive authority – as equivalent to a judicial one, whilst at first reading one might 
have thought that the notion of “equivalence” would relate to fundamental guarantees concern-
ing independence and impartiality. 
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without there being any need of a prior decision at Community level; and that 
Member States have a duty to inform each other, the Commission and the 
Council, in respect of “violations and enforcement problems or judgments 
handed down by national courts” (Art. 8).
The regime introduced by the Regulation is therefore atypical, since it 
allows Member States to unilaterally disregard the freezing order at Commu-
nity level, and it acknowledges the fact that “enforcement problems” and 
national rulings might affect the regime established by the Community. The 
reason for these provisions is easily second-guessed: the Member States clearly 
wished to avoid the danger of finding themselves in a constitutional trap where 
they would be forced to choose between, on the one hand, complying with 
their domestic legal requirements to give effect to national courts’ rulings; and, 
on the other hand, complying with their EC obligations as to the freezing of 
funds. Thus, the Regulation allows Member States to depart unilaterally from 
the obligations therein imposed. Further, since the existence of a national deci-
sion is a precondition for the lawful exercise of the Council’s competence to 
include an organization or individual in the list, the annulment of the national 
decision by a national court should lead, if and when the EU listing is based 
solely upon the decision in that State, to the nullity of the Community decision 
for lack of one of the requirements necessary for inclusion in the list.46 
It is the existence of this bridge between national and EU/EC decisions con-
cerning inclusion in the EU list that might explain the CFI’s willingness to 
delegate judicial protection in the first instance to national authorities/courts. 
Thus, the CFI held that the Council’s duty is limited to ascertain the existence 
of a national decision. And, that the standard of review operated by the Court 
in this respect is that of a manifest error of assessment, such as was present in 
the PMOI III ruling where the Council did not prove that there was a decision 
of a national authority. Therefore, not surprisingly, the Court also held that 
pending review at national level the Council acts prudently in not de-listing 
someone. And yet, even though at first sight the legal regime provided by the 
Regulation might support the findings of the Court, on closer scrutiny the 
Court’s interpretation might be called into question. These two points (reloca-
tion of judicial protection and manifest error of assessment) will be examined 
in detail below.
46. The CFI has preferred not to rule explicitly on the matter, see para 40 PMOI III “Even 
assuming that the Council was not under a duty to remove the applicant from the disputed list 
following the POAC decision …” (emphasis added). 
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6.2. The (re)location of judicial protection in the hands of the national   
 authorities
As mentioned above, the starting point of the Court’s analysis is that judicial 
protection is to be guaranteed first (and foremost) at national level. Thus, as 
long as a decision at national level is pending, the supervision of the Court, and 
even that of the Council, is limited. From a practical viewpoint, this approach 
is easily justified: after all, national courts are better equipped to look into 
complex evidence, both because their rules of procedure are designed for such 
tasks, and because national authorities might be more willing to produce sensi-
tive evidence in front of their own courts. And there can be little doubt that the 
rules of procedure that govern the Community courts are ill equipped to accom-
modate discussion of potentially incriminating and classified evidence. In this 
respect, it should be noted that both the CFI and the ECJ are fully aware of the 
delicate tasks they are called to perform and both courts have made clear that 
where such requests are justified, they are prepared to accommodate the needs 
of national and public security by authorizing that evidence should be dis-
closed only to the court. And yet, procedurally this might be not very satisfac-
tory, since the lawyers of the party alleged to be connected to terrorism would 
not have a right as such to be made privy to this evidence, so that in any case 
the right of the defence would be crippled. 
Furthermore, in the OMPI/PMOI ruling the CFI held that the duty to a “fair 
hearing must be safeguarded in the first place as part of the national proce-
dure” and that it is in “that context that the party concerned must be placed in 
a position in which he can effectively make known his views of the matters on 
which the decision is based”.47 This seems to suggest that national authorities 
might have Community law duties when dealing with national decisions that 
later triggered inclusion in the Community law list. How far these duties 
stretch it is difficult to say: on the one hand, general principles of Community 
law, suggest that these obligations might be far reaching.48 Thus, according to 
47. Para 119, OMPI/PMOI, cited supra note 1, emphasis added.
48. See also Case T-253/02, Ayadi v. Council, [2006] ECR II-2139, esp. paras. 146 et seq. 
(appeal pending, Case C-403/06); in that case the CFI held that in relation to the UN derived list, 
which is implemented at Community level by Council Regulation 881/2002, Member States are 
bound by Art. 6 TEU and therefore have a duty to respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by 
Community law and the ECHR in relation to requests from listed persons to make representa-
tions on their behalf for delisting purposes. Furthermore, the decision relating to the representa-
tion process must be, as a matter of Community law, subject to judicial review. However, it is not 
clear whether the Ayadi ruling rested on the premise that the CFI had limited its own jurisdiction 
in relation to the fundamental rights scrutiny at Community level, limitation then overruled by 
the ECJ in Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council, cited supra note 8, or whether it is of general appli-
cation. 
1256  Case law CML Rev. 2009
 consistent case law, the general principles of Community law apply whenever 
the situation falls within the scope of Community law.49 The CFI reference to 
Community law obligations in relation to the national procedure indicates that 
once a person has been included in the Community list, the matter falls within 
the scope of Community law even when the decision of the national authority 
predated the decision at Community level. This leaves open the possibility of 
applying Community law fundamental rights directly, as well as the possibility 
of a preliminary reference in relation to whether the national rules comply with 
such principles. On the other hand, Member States might be less than happy 
about a Community law spill-over in so sensitive an area. For instance, if the 
national listing process becomes a matter falling within the scope of Commu-
nity law, would the ECJ have jurisdiction on a preliminary reference to assess 
the compatibility with Community law fundamental rights of the British pro-
scription system? 
On the other hand, and more fundamentally, from a constitutional perspec-
tive it might be questioned whether the delegation of judicial protection to 
national authorities is consistent with established principles governing the 
relationship between Community and national law. 
6.3. Relocation of judicial protection at national level: A threat to   
 supremacy and fundamental rights protection in the EU? 
As mentioned above, the Court held that if a national decision within the mean-
ing of the Regulation has been adopted, then it is for the national authorities to 
ensure judicial protection in the first instance. In this respect, the role of the 
Council and the review performed by the Court appear to be limited in scope, 
aimed at ascertaining that the national authority falls within the definition pro-
vided for in the Common Position; and that no subsequent finding at national 
level has had an impact on the decision to maintain someone in the list. Other 
than in those cases, the CFI does not seem inclined to intervene, or there is 
nothing in the rulings here noted, or in the OMPI/PMOI ruling, that suggests it 
would. This abdication of judicial responsibility calls into question both the 
principle of supremacy and the compatibility of this system with the principle 
of effective judicial protection. 
49. This is the case both when the Member States are implementing Community law, e.g. 
Case 5/88, Wachauf, [1989] ECR 2609; and when the situation falls within the scope of Commu-
nity law by virtue of the situation being connected with it, e.g. because the MS is invoking a 
Treaty derogation or a mandatory requirement in relation to the free movement provisions, e.g. 
Case C-260/89, ERT, [1991] ECR I-2995.
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In relation to the former, consider that the EU is regulated by its own con-
stitutional system and is bound by its own fundamental rights standards as 
decided by the Community judicature. This is true even in relation to measures 
adopted to fight terrorism, as confirmed by the ECJ in the Kadi case. Here, one 
might well argue that the ruling in PMOI III is the demonstration that the CFI 
is both willing and able to guarantee the rights of organizations and individuals 
listed. After all, in that case the Court ultimately annulled the Council’s Deci-
sion on more substantive grounds, and that ruling led to the delisting of the 
applicants at Community level. And yet, it should be noted that the CFI in the 
PMOI III ruling did not engage with the substantive question as to whether the 
PMOI could be defined as a terrorist organization according to Community 
law. Rather, the Council’s Decision was annulled on two grounds: first, breach 
of the right of defence, because the Council failed to provide an adequate state-
ment of reasons. And, secondly, because the Council did not demonstrate that 
there was a decision at national level within the meaning of Common Position 
2001/931. However, and as demonstrated by the PMOI II ruling, when a 
national decision exists and the Council has effectively discharged its proce-
dural duties, then the matter must be raised at national level first. 
So, in order to have a reasonable chance of been taken off the Community 
list a claimant has to first pursue, and win, his/its case in front of the national 
authorities; however, it should be noted that the national authorities would 
have regard to the national definition of terrorism/terrorist act, since Regula-
tion 2580/2001 does not attempt to harmonize the term. Consequently, as mat-
ters stand at present, it would be possible for an individual to be listed at 
national level on a broader definition of terrorism, and to see his inclusion in 
the list confirmed at national level even though he did not fall within the defi-
nition of terrorist contained in Regulation 2580/2001. This seems a constitu-
tionally incoherent result since, according to established principles, Community 
law has to be given a uniform meaning across the EU.50 
Furthermore, and leaving aside the possible fundamental rights obligations 
mentioned above,51 this would also mean that the standard of fundamental 
rights protection to be applied in relation to the substantive issues as to whether 
someone is connected with terrorism would be that decided by national law. 
50. See e.g. in the context of the free movement of persons, Case 75/63, Hoekstra, [1964] 
ECR 1771. 
51. If the matter fell within the scope of Community law, which as explained above might be 
a possibility, then of course the national court would not be able to fall below the Community 
standard. However, and as mentioned above, it is not obvious that such an intrusion in national 
systems (and through the medium of Community rather than Third Pillar law) would be consti-
tutionally sound, and in any event would be politically very controversial. However, if the 
national decision is to be kept to a certain extent separate from the Union/Community decision, 
then the fundamental rights standard applicable would be only the national law one. 
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This might be higher, lower or equivalent to the Community fundamental 
rights standard but is not the Community law standard.52 And this is difficult to 
square with the constitutional principles established by the ECJ in over thirty 
years of case law according to which Community acts can be assessed only in 
relation to the Community own constitutional system; and that the Community 
judicature alone is competent to decide upon the validity of Community law.53 
Relocation of judicial protection at national level also raises considerable 
problems in relation to the principle of effective judicial protection. In this 
respect, it should be noted that the decision to list at Community level might 
originate from more than one Member State; and that following a national 
decision to annul inclusion in the national list, another Member State might 
decide to take a decision so that the formal pre-conditions for inclusion in the 
Community list are still satisfied (as was the case in relation to the PMOI fol-
lowing the POAC decision). Delegation of judicial responsibility as to the sub-
stantive reasons for inclusion to national authorities means then that someone 
who has been placed on the Community list might have to bring judicial pro-
ceedings in more than one Member State. Aside from the constitutional issues 
mentioned above, this clearly creates problems in relation to the notion of 
effective judicial protection; and, of differing protection across the Union.
The notion of effective judicial protection, which binds the Community,54 
entails also the notion of a reasonably speedy protection.55 The requirement 
that in order to bring successful annulment proceedings before the Community 
judicature, the person/organization affected should first demand review at 
national level, possibly in more than one Member State, creates an additional, 
and significant, burden which is at odds with ensuring that proceedings are not 
52. When acting within the scope or implementing Community law and exercising discretion 
Member States have an obligation not to fall below the Community law standard rather than to 
apply the Community law standard. 
53. Consistent case law, e.g. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, [1969] ECR 419; Case 
11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] ECR 1125; and Case 4/73, Nold v. Commis-
sion, [1974] ECR 491. Relocation of judicial responsibility at national level also entails consid-
erable differences in Community standards of judicial protection in relation to a Community act, 
which is also questionable in relation to a Community act that directly and individually affects 
natural and legal persons. It should be noted, that when applicants have Art. 230 EC standing 
they might choose to bring proceedings in front of national courts (subject to Community time 
limits) but are by no means obliged to do so.
54. Consistent case law, e.g. recently Joined Cases, Kadi and Al Barakaat, cited supra note 
8, esp. para 335. 
55. See e.g. Case C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe v. Commission, [1998] ECR I-8417, esp. 
paras. 26–44; Joined Cases C-403/04 P & 405/04 P, Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd et al. v. Com-
mission, [2007] ECR I-9045, esp. para 115; this is established case law also at ECHR level, see 
e.g. Case of Garyfallou AEBE v. Greece (Appl. No 18996/91), judgment of 24 Sept. 1997, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V, 1821.
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unreasonably lengthy. It should be recalled, in fact, that even when the appli-
cant is successful at national level, he/she would still need to bring proceed-
ings before the Community judicature to ensure Community delisting. In this 
respect consider the consequences of the CFI’s refusal to adjudicate on the 
substantive merits of the listing of the PMOI. As mentioned above, the fact that 
in the first two cases, and to a certain extent in the third one, the CFI limited its 
criticism to procedural matters meant that the OMPI/PMOI proceedings took 
in total 6 years and 4 months.56 In the Baustahlgewebe case,57 the ECJ upheld 
the claimants’ complaint that proceedings that took in total 5 years and 6 
months were unduly lengthy. Here, it should be noted that it cannot be main-
tained that the length of proceedings should be assessed having regard to the 
three different cases taken separately, since the need to bring further proceed-
ings arose because of the combination of the CFI’s refusal to look into the 
substance of the case; and the updating system provided for by Regulation 
2580/2001, which determines the adoption of a new decision every 6 months. 
Thus, in most cases, the Court’s ruling is obsolete at the time of delivery. In 
this respect, the European Court of Human Rights has made clear that the rea-
sonableness of the length of proceedings has to be determined as a whole, and 
that it falls upon the States to organize their judicial system so as to comply 
with Article 6(1) ECHR.58 Since the OMPI/PMOI cases all related to the same 
issue, i.e. whether the applicants’ inclusion in the list was justified, it is doubt-
ful that the length of proceedings can be determined having regard to each 
single case. And, arguably, as the case law stands now, the length of proceed-
ings at national level should also be included in assessing compliance with the 
ECHR of the Community system of judicial protection. The 27 Member States 
could then be held collectively responsible for proceedings which are exces-
sively lengthy because of the failure in judicial protection in one Member State 
coupled with the Community judicature’s failure to assess the merits of inclu-
sion in the Community list for themselves.
The potential multiplication of proceedings inherent in the CFI’s approach 
would only be consistent with the principle of effective judicial protection if 
the principle of supremacy were to be sacrificed so that national courts could 
declare the freezing of assets at Community level invalid. This seems a consti-
tutional heresy which means that the hermeneutic monopoly of the Commu-
nity judicature over Community law must apply also in those cases, and also 
in relation to the substantive reasons that justify inclusion in the Community 
list, and therefore the suggestion that national authorities have a role to play 
56. The first case was lodged on 26 July 2002 and the PMOI III ruling was decided on the 
4 Dec. 2008.
57. Baustahlgewebe v. Commission, cited supra note 55.
58. Case of Garyfallou AEBE v. Greece, cited supra note 55, esp. para 40. 
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seems irrelevant. This is all the more so should one consider that the listing at 
Community level might have been triggered at the request of a third State.
6.4. The Council’s discretion and the manifest error of assessment limit
The second debatable premise is that the Council enjoys a broad margin of 
discretion in deciding whether to include someone in the list and that, as a 
result, the standard of review is that of a “manifest error of assessment”, i.e. 
the standard used in relation to political decisions. 
This approach might be explained having regard to the Court’s (mis)under-
standing of the system of cooperation between Member States and European 
institutions introduced by the Common Position and the Regulation.59 Since it 
is for the national authorities to identify groups and organizations in the first 
instance, and since it is for the national courts/authorities to review those deci-
sions, then the Council enjoys both little discretion,60 in that it cannot identify 
for itself those to be included nor can it question the national legal framework 
which led to inclusion;61 and broad discretion, since it is not obliged to include 
in the EU list those who have been identified by a national authority. For this 
reason, the Court is not going to go much beyond a review of whether the con-
ditions of legality provided for in the Regulation have been complied for and 
will limit its review to determine whether there has been a manifest error of 
assessment.62 Whilst it is true that the Court stated that it can review the inter-
pretation made by the Council of the relevant facts, establishing whether the 
evidence is accurate, reliable and consistent, as well as ascertaining that such 
evidence contains all the relevant information and that it is capable of substan-
tiating the conclusions drawn from it, the Court also makes clear that it will not 
substitute its own assessment for that of the Council.63 From a substantive 
viewpoint then, the Court’s review appears rather limited, especially given that 
59. The Court in this respect refers to Art. 10 EC (para 132 PMOI II) which, following the 
ruling in Case C-105/03, Pupino, [2005] ECR I-5285, applies also to the area of cooperation in 
criminal matters. However, it should be noted that the measures at issue in the cases here noted 
were CFSP measures. Third Pillar jurisdiction was relevant only in relation to those entities and 
individuals that had a link with the EU. It is thus unclear whether the CFI is indicating a possi-
ble extension of the Pupino doctrine to the area of CFSP.
60. In the PMOI II ruling the Court held that the specific form of cooperation introduced by 
Reg. 2580/2001 entails an obligation for the Council to “defer as far as possible to the assess-
ment conducted by the competent national authority, at least where it is a judicial authority, in 
particular in respect of the existence of ‘serious and credible evidence or clues’ on which its deci-
sion is based” (para 133). 
61. See OMPI/PMOI, cited supra note 1, para 121. 
62. Para 141, PMOI II.
63. Ibid., para 138.
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the Council only needs to be satisfied of the existence of a national decision; 
that it should not concern itself with whether the fundamental rights of the 
individual/organization have been respected at national level; and that, in the 
case of decisions to maintain persons in the list, inclusion is still justified hav-
ing regard in particular to action taken upon that decision of the competent 
national authority. For this reason, the burden of proof has a “relatively lim-
ited” scope in relation to Community procedure to freeze assets.64 Not surpris-
ingly then, in the PMOI II case (in relation to the June Decision), the Court 
found that since there was a decision of a national authority (the British Home 
Secretary), the Council did not make a manifest error of assessment. 
The Court’s unwillingness to engage with the substantive issue of whether 
the applicants are indeed terrorists according to the Community regime, how-
ever, appears to be flawed. Here, whilst it is indeed true that the existence of a 
national decision is a necessary precondition for the legality of the Council’s 
decision to include someone in the EU list, that in itself is not sufficient. 
Consider in fact, that both the Common Position and the Regulation contain 
their own definition of “terrorist” and “terrorist act” and an individual or orga-
nization can be included in the Community list only if he/it is connected with 
terrorism within the meaning of the Union/Community definition.65 Thus, the 
existence of a national decision is a necessary but not sufficient precondition 
for including someone in the Union list. The person/organization concerned 
must also have committed/seeking to commit terrorist acts as defined in the 
relevant Union/Community legislation, and not just as defined in national law. 
And in this respect, there is no Council discretion: either there is sufficient 
evidence to include a person in the list, or there is not. The Council’s discretion 
might exist in relation to the adoption of the Regulation, i.e. in relation to the 
decision that in the interest of fighting terrorism the assets of some individuals 
and organizations might be subject to a preventive freezing order even lacking 
a judicial determination as to whether there is conclusive evidence that 
those listed are connected to terrorism. This can be considered a policy mea-
sure the review of which is naturally limited.66 However, in relation to the 
64. Ibid., para 134.
65. The fact that the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002, on com-
bating Terrorism, O.J. 2002, L 164/3 (amended by Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA 
of 28 Nov. 2008, O.J. 2008, L 320/21) has given a common definition of terrorist offence, which 
in any case is broader than that contained in Common Position 2001/931 and Reg. 2580/2001, 
reinforces rather than weakens this finding.
66. Here, care should be taken not to confuse the listing of individuals with the system of 
“smart sanctions” where the aim is to target a regime or a country without disproportionate 
effects on the civilian population and which might incidentally have negative repercussions 
against innocent individuals (as it was the case in Case C-84/95, Bosphorus v. Minister for 
Transport, Energy and Communications and others, [1996] ECR I-3953). 
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identification of the individuals there is no political discretion, or else the fact 
that the Regulation and the Common Position define who is to be considered a 
terrorist would be meaningless. Thus, since the definition of “terrorist” for EU 
listing purposes is a Community definition, the CFI must review all of the 
evidence and interpret that definition to give it its Community meaning.67 Nor 
could it be objected that the fact that the definition of terrorism is contained in 
the Common Position and is incorporated in the Regulation only by reference 
deprives the Court of jurisdiction. The express reference to the Common Posi-
tion does in fact incorporate such definition in a Community instrument which, 
as such, cannot be sheltered from review. This is further confirmed by the 
Court itself in the PMOI II ruling when it agreed to interpret the definition of 
terrorism in relation to whether it analysed the extent to which past behaviour 
is relevant for inclusion in the list.68
If the Court has jurisdiction over the interpretation of the definition of ter-
rorism, then the burden of proof should go much beyond the need to prove the 
existence of a national decision: it should concern the evidence which justifies 
defining a person or an organization as “terrorist” according to the Community 
standard. This is all the more important since the national decision which trig-
gers listing at Community level might have been taken by a State outside the 
European Union.69 In this respect, and as mentioned above, it is clear that the 
need to assess whether the individual/organization has been involved in ter-
rorist activity as defined by Community law is of paramount importance in 
ensuring that the decision is actually legally justified rather than politically 
motivated.
7. Concluding remarks
The Court of First Instance was undoubtedly faced with a very difficult issue 
and its reticence to engage in a substantive review of the reasons that led to the 
inclusion of the PMOI in the EU list might be understood having regard to the 
fact that its procedural rules are ill adapted to engage in such matters. And, the 
67. The fact that Community law should be given a Community and not a national meaning 
is consistent case law and justified by the need to ensure uniformity in the application of 
 Community law; see e.g. in the context of the free movement of persons, Hoekstra, cited supra 
note 50. 
68. PMOI II, para 107.
69. And given that following the OMPI/PMOI ruling the Council is not, in the CFI’s view, 
empowered to look into the standard of fundamental rights protection in the originating country 
(see para 121), and that the originating country might not be part of the ECHR, this is all the 
more important.
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evolution in the case law seems to suggest an increased willingness to scruti-
nize the Council’s reasons for including individuals and organizations in the 
list. However, the circumstances of the PMOI III case were rather extreme, and 
it is not obvious that the findings in that case do much to enhance the protec-
tion of fundamental rights at Union level. In this respect, the starting premises 
seem still good law: as it is evident from the PMOI II case in relation to the 
June Decision, the Court of First Instance seems willing to delegate the assess-
ment of the substantive reasons that led to inclusion to the national authorities; 
and to confine its review to the manifest error of assessment standard. 
This is questionable, both in relation to the premises upon which the Com-
munity constitutional system is founded; and in relation to fundamental rights 
protection. The interpretation of Community law, and the assessment of its 
validity, is solely the task of the Community judicature. In this respect, delega-
tion of judicial responsibility to the national authorities seems wholly inconsis-
tent with established constitutional principles as well as problematic from an 
ECHR perspective. Nor is there any reason why the Court should show such 
deference to the Council. When the latter adopted Regulation 2580/2001 it 
should have been aware of the fact that the Community judicature would have 
full and exclusive jurisdiction over its interpretation, including the interpreta-
tion of what is to be defined as a “terrorist act” for Community law purposes, 
and of the evidence produced to substantiate inclusion of persons and organi-
zations in the list. No duty of loyal cooperation can justify a pick and choose 
approach to Community law: if the Member States wish to give freezing orders 
pan-European effects then they cannot complain when individuals seek pan-
European protection. Whilst it is true that justice might finally have been done 
in the case of the PMOI, since it no longer included in the EU list, from the 
viewpoint of the Community constitutional system, this seems very much a 
Pyrrhic victory since the CFI’s rulings are still well short of enforcing an effec-
tive system of judicial protection.
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